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Foreword
In December 1976, a study entitled The Accounting Establishment 
was released by the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and 
Management of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
The study was prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee. “The 
major purpose of this study,” according to Subcommittee Chairman 
Lee Metcalf, “is to provide Congress and the public with an under­
standing of the various private organizations and Federal agencies 
involved in establishing and administering accounting practices which 
have substantial impact on Federal policies and programs, as well as 
private economic decisions.”
On March 1, 1977, Senator Sam Nunn, of Georgia, a member of 
the Subcommittee, informed AICPA Board Chairman Michael N. 
Chetkovich that hearings on the accounting profession were scheduled 
for this spring and asked Mr. Chetkovich for comments on the report 
as a whole, “with particular emphasis on its recommendations.”
This request resulted in the following memorandum of comment 
on the staff study and in the accompanying transmittal letter in which 
the memorandum is briefly summarized.
W a l l a c e  E. O l s o n , President 
American Institute of CPAs
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March 28, 1977
The Honorable Sam Nunn
United States Senate
110 Russell Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Nunn:
Re: The Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and 
Management, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
entitled “ The Accounting Establishment”
Thank you for the opportunity to present this preliminary response on 
behalf of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the 
“ Institute” ) to the Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting 
and Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs (the “ staff 
study” ) entitled “ The Accounting Establishment.”  Attached is a more 
detailed response to the issues raised by the staff study. We expect to 
elaborate in later submissions and in testimony at the hearings we 
understand are planned by the Subcommittee.
The Institute is a voluntary association consisting of approximately 130,000 
certified public accountants and is the largest organization of accountants 
in the world. It has been the principal force for the last 75 years in 
developing, strengthening and refining financial accounting and auditing 
standards.
The purpose of this letter and the accompanying memorandum is to 
discuss the role of the accounting profession with respect to the 
credibility of financial statements prepared by management and provided 
to investors, creditors and the public; to outline the history of the 
continuing efforts of the profession to strengthen this role; and to describe 
the efforts and resources presently dedicated to the continuing solution 
of the evolving problems in the financial reporting process.
 We believe that this analysis will demonstrate that the accounting 
profession has acted responsibly in the past and has the will and capability 
to deal with problems relating to financial reporting in the future and that 
the transfer of the standard-setting responsibility to governmental hands
While this response has been approved by the Board of Directors of the 
Institute, it does not purport to reflect the views of all 130,000 members.
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would impede, rather than further, the resolution of such problems. Also, 
we believe that the record of the profession refutes the principal charges 
leveled at the Institute, the accounting profession, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the staff 
study and shows that such charges are not supported by the study.
Events of recent years have focused attention on the importance of audited 
financial statements in our economy. It has been recognized as never 
before that these statements are of critical importance to investors, 
creditors and the public; as a consequence, the performance of those 
associated with them is a matter of legitimate public concern. This period 
has seen huge and dramatic corporate failures and cunning and well- 
publicized frauds perpetrated on investors (and auditors) by unscrupulous 
promoters. These events have given rise to vast amounts of litigation 
against everyone involved in the corporate process— officers, directors, 
attorneys, accountants— and charges of improper accounting and auditing.
It is not surprising that public accountants have been the targets of such 
attention since they are important to the process of financial disclosure. 
Much of the criticism has its origins in the misconception that financial 
statements are prepared by auditors. The preparation of financial 
statements is the responsibility of management; the auditor’s responsibility 
is to examine them for conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles. Also, there is a lack of understanding of the limits imposed by 
cost and other considerations and of the extent of assurance auditors 
can reasonably give with respect to financial statements.
The Institute does not assert that auditors have been completely without 
blame in some of the cases that are mentioned in the staff study or that the 
concerns expressed in the staff study are totally groundless; there are 
problems in financial reporting that must be resolved. However, a fair 
consideration of those cases and those concerns requires also a fair 
consideration of the substantial efforts which the profession has made and 
is continuing to make to avoid repetitions of past problems, as well as to 
anticipate new problems. It should be recognized that as a result of these 
efforts the quality of financial reporting in the United States is better 
than anywhere else in the world.
The more important of these efforts are described in the attached 
memorandum of which the following is a brief summary:
1. Financial Accounting Standards. At the present time financial 
accounting standards (sometimes referred to as accounting principles) 
are being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
Headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut, it was established some four 
years ago in response to recommendations of a committee chaired by 
Francis M. Wheat, Esq., formerly a commissioner of the Securities and
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Exchange Commission. That committee, which included only a minority of 
practicing CPAs, concluded unequivocally that accounting standard setting 
should take place in the private sector. The FASB engages in extensive 
research and thus far has issued 20 exposure drafts of proposed standards 
and has published some 14 accounting standards, 18 interpretations and 
13 discussion memoranda and has held 14 public hearings. It has an 
extensive agenda. Some 12 items are under study. This production has 
not only been voluminous, but it has also effected significant changes in 
accounting. The Board’s approach has been thoughtful, careful, and 
diligent, and there is every reason to believe that given reasonable time it 
will resolve the presently recognized major issues pertaining to financial 
accounting standards and those that emerge in the future. To help assure 
the continuing effectiveness of the Board, the trustees of the Financial 
Accounting Foundation, the entity which secures the financing for the 
Board and generally oversees its activities, are making an in-depth review 
of the structure and operations of the Board, which is to be completed 
very shortly.
The staff study alleges that the SEC has improperly delegated its authority 
over accounting matters to the profession. It is true that the SEC has 
allowed the profession to take the initiative in establishing financial 
accounting standards. However, the record shows that the SEC has not 
hesitated to step in and take action on its own whenever it has felt that this 
procedure was not yielding satisfactory results. In addition, the SEC 
makes very effective use of the ample opportunities for expressing its 
views to the standard-setting bodies. The arrangement complained of 
in the staff study has existed for almost 40 years without any public dissent 
from any SEC chairman, commissioner or chief accountant and with the 
full knowledge of all sectors including the Congress. Furthermore, there is 
no showing that a direct exercise of authority by the Commission during 
this time would have yielded higher or better standards.
2. Auditing Standards. Audits provide reasonable assurance that matters 
are as represented in financial statements. Auditing standards are the 
rules that regulate the manner in which financial statements are examined 
by independent auditors and the manner in which auditors express their 
opinions on such statements. Auditing standards are formulated by 
the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, a senior committee of the 
Institute. These standards are being developed and refined on a 
continuing basis, thus providing prompt response to constantly changing 
needs. The present activity is vigorous and fruitful. Also it is fair to 
observe that many of the deficiencies alleged against auditors do not stem 
from shortcomings in auditing standards.
Many forces are operating to strengthen auditing standards and 
procedures and to decrease the possibility of misleading audited 
financial statements.
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a. An independent commission on auditors’ responsibilities appointed 
by the Institute in October 1974 is headed by a former chairman
of the SEC (three of the seven members are practicing accountants; 
the others are a lawyer, a businessman, a financial analyst, and 
an educator). The commission expects to publish a preliminary 
report by April 1 of this year; this report is expected to call for 
various measures to be undertaken to strengthen the audit function;
b. Accounting firms, as a consequence of the increasing complexity
of business transactions and sensitivity to rising public expectations, 
have strengthened their internal quality controls, supervision, 
training and audit procedures; and
c. Most large firms have arranged to have their practices and 
procedures reviewed by another firm or a panel appointed by the 
Institute to evaluate the adequacy of their quality control procedures.
3. Independence. Auditors are subject to stringent rules promulgated 
by the Institute, state boards of accountancy, state societies of certified 
public accountants, the SEC and other federal agencies regulating the 
relationship between the auditors and their clients. These rules are 
designed to assure independence from clients. With very few exceptions 
the cases cited as instances of audit failure do not involve the slightest 
evidence that lack of independence was a factor.
The staff study asserts that the independence of auditors is impaired by 
their performance of certain services, such as management advisory 
services, tax advice, and the like. There is no evidence that the 
performance of these services has compromised any auditor; on the 
contrary, the performance of such services generally assists the auditor by 
affording him an opportunity to learn more about the client, its internal 
controls, the quality of its personnel and its operations, knowledge that is 
helpful to the performance of the audit function.
Contrary to the suggestion of the staff study, the testifying by accountants 
on their own behalf before congressional committees and other public 
bodies does not evidence impaired independence. To deny auditors the 
opportunity to assist in the development of policy would be to deny them 
a basic right and would deprive policy makers of valuable assistance and 
advice. Moreover, clients’ opinions vary; thus, while an auditor’s testimony 
may please some clients, it often may displease others.
Auditor independence has been strengthened by the SEC requirement that 
changes of auditors be publicly reported and disagreements about 
accounting principles between the departing auditor and the client be 
disclosed. Reports filed with the SEC indicate that in five years, 165 
changes of auditors involving disagreements over accounting principles
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have occurred. In addition, there have been innumerable instances where 
clients have agreed to modify their financial statements at the insistence 
of the auditors without a change in auditors taking place.
Accounting firms have developed sophisticated systems to assure 
compliance with standards of independence and these standards are 
rigidly enforced. Furthermore, the growth in the number of audit 
committees made up of outside directors (after July 1, 1978, every 
company with securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange must 
have such a committee) provides a means for auditors to resolve auditing 
problems with non-management directors.
4. Domination. The staff study asserts that the AICPA and the accounting 
profession are dominated by the “ Big Eight” accounting firms. The facts 
and figures contradict this charge. Members of the “ Big Eight” firms are 
one-third or less of the Institute Council, its ultimate policy-making body, 
and of the Board of Directors. Also, they do not dominate the senior 
technical committees; for instance, members affiliated with “ Big Eight” 
firms on one of the most important Institute committees (the Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee, which is singled out for discussion in the 
staff report) are less than a majority (8 out of 21). Any proposal to carry
in this Committee must receive a two-thirds vote. Of course, the fact 
is that the “ Big Eight” firms are not a monolith; on most substantive 
professional issues, there are strong differences of opinion among them.
These large firms audit a high proportion of publicly held companies.
They naturally have a keen interest in committees of the Institute working 
on the problems of auditing such companies, and their partners have much 
to offer to the work of those committees. Furthermore, because of their 
size, they often are better able to commit personnel and resources to the 
voluntary work of the Institute. Finally, there is no showing whatsoever that 
the presence in relatively large numbers of partners of the “ Big Eight” 
firms on Institute committees has operated to the detriment of the public 
interest or the profession.
5. Liability. The staff study proposes legislative reversal of the 1976 
Supreme Court decision in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, which held that to 
sustain an action for damages under the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 a misconduct 
greater than simple negligence must be alleged and shown. The staff 
study discussion of this matter overlooks the fact that auditors continue
to be liable for negligence in connection with registration statements 
under the Securities Act of 1933; that, according to some courts 
of appeal, they continue to be liable for recklessness and similar 
misconduct in connection with damages arising out of market transactions; 
that substantial liabilities may still accrue against them as evidenced by
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the Equity Funding settlement ($39 million contributed by the auditors 
or their insurers); and that some courts of appeal have held that negligence 
is sufficient to sustain an action by the SEC.
6. Concentration. The staff study asserts that there is undue concentration 
in the accounting profession because a large percentage of the audits
of listed companies are done by the “ Big Eight’’ firms. Audits of publicly 
held companies frequently require services in tens, and in some cases, 
hundreds, of locations. Thus the emergence of large accounting firms is 
substantially attributable to the nature of demands for auditing services 
which have developed as American corporations have grown larger and 
expanded the scope of their operations.
7. Disciplinary Matters. The staff study has criticized the Institute’s efforts 
to appropriately discipline its members for misdeeds.
It is true that relatively few disciplinary matters stemming from highly 
publicized cases have been concluded. A large number are pending since 
the Institute has considered it unwise and potentially unfair to carry 
through disciplinary proceedings against allegedly errant CPAs while civil 
litigation and SEC proceedings were pending. The standards for 
determining whether a member of the Institute should be subjected to 
disciplinary measures are higher than those which characterize civil 
litigation or an SEC proceeding. Consequently a determination by the 
Institute to discipline a member could seriously prejudice that member in 
related proceedings. In all cases where it appears that a member is 
charged with some misdeed— and this includes virtually all instances in 
which members are charged in court or before the SEC with misconduct— 
a proceeding is commenced against him and it is processed to conclusion 
as soon as the other proceedings have terminated.
In appraising the adequacy of regulation of the profession it must be 
recognized that the Institute is by no means the only discipline to which 
accountants are subject; state licensing authorities, state CPA societies, 
the SEC and other governmental agencies, and private litigation provide 
other disciplinary restraints which in their totality are very formidable.
Conclusion. An examination of the staff study discloses a significant gap 
between the purported evidence and the recommendations. Furthermore 
there is a total lack of evidence that adoption of the recommendations in 
the staff study would remedy any of the alleged faults.
Most important, the staff study fails to recognize the tremendous efforts 
that are being made by the accounting profession to eliminate as far as 
humanly possible the causes of misleading financial statements./The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board, in existence less than four years,
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is moving vigorously to resolve problems that have plagued issuers and 
accountants for generations. The Auditing Standards Executive Committee 
is persistently seeking to strengthen standards and to clarify the 
responsibilities of auditors; it is expected that the recommendations of 
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, appointed by the Institute 
and headed by former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, will go far to assist 
this effort. As a consequence of the sensitivity of the profession to public 
needs, concerns, and expectations, greater vigilance on the part of the 
SEC, and extensive litigation, accounting firms at great cost have 
strengthened their systems of quality control and their means of 
avoiding errors.
We respectfully suggest that imposing a vast new scheme of federal 
regulation on the accounting profession is unnecessary. We submit that 
the evidence is clear that the profession has the competence, the incentive, 
and the desire to effect any changes necessary to provide enhanced 
reliability of financial reports.
Respectfully submitted,
Michael N. Chetkovich 
Chairman of the Board
cc: Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
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Memorandum of Comment 
by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants 
on the Study by the Staff of the 
Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management, 
U.S. Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, Entitled 
“The Accounting Establishment”
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to the recommendations 
presented in the study by the staff of the Subcommittee on Reports, Ac­
counting and Management of the U.S. Senate Committee on Govern­
mental Affairs, entitled “The Accounting Establishment.” In so doing it 
will discuss the manner in which financial accounting and auditing stand­
ards are established in this country, the ways in which the independence of 
auditors is assured, and the forces, both public and private, that seek to 
assure the integrity of the financial reporting process.  We believe this dis­
cussion will establish that there are presently in place in the accounting 
profession mechanisms, methods, and people that are fully capable of 
providing to the American people the assurances they want and need 
concerning the integrity of financial statements prepared by American 
business. Furthermore, this entire process is effectively overseen in the 
public interest by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has been 
an active participant in the development of accounting standards since 
1934.
This is not to deny the legitimacy of the concerns which motivated the 
staff study. In the wake of such dramatic business failures as Penn Central 
and such blatant management frauds as Equity Funding, National Student 
Marketing, and Stirling Homex, the demands for higher standards for all 
those concerned with the corporate process in this country—officers, direc­
tors, attorneys, auditors—have been insistent and proper.
While this memorandum has been approved by the Board of Directors of the 
Institute, it does not purport to reflect the views of all 130,000 members of the 
Institute.
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No systems, in accounting or any other line of endeavor, can ever insure 
against human shortcomings; however, the risks of breakdowns in financial 
reporting are being steadily and speedily reduced. We hope that this 
memorandum will demonstrate the seriousness, the extensiveness, the vigor, 
and the success of the profession’s efforts to improve financial reporting. 
And we believe that a federal initiative at this time would impede, if not 
destroy, these efforts and needlessly involve the federal government in 
the affairs of the profession.
Entirely apart from the merits of the charges made with respect to the 
past conduct of members of the accounting profession, a careful reading 
of the staff study shows no relationship between the charges against the 
profession, its bodies, and the SEC, and the business failures and misleading 
financial statements mentioned. Moreover, there is no evidence that the 
tight federal control of the profession proposed by the staff study would 
reduce hazards to the public.
Finally, this memorandum is not intended to present a point-by-point 
contradiction of incorrect information contained in the staff study or dispute 
each of the allegations contained in it; that will be done in the course of 
the upcoming hearings, submissions of other parties, and possible future 
memoranda from the Institute.
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
This memorandum is submitted by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (the Institute). The Institute is the national pro­
fessional organization of certified public accountants. Certified public 
accountants (CPAs) are accountants who have completed extensive educa­
tional requirements and have passed a series of complex uniform examina­
tions prepared by the Institute and administered by the accountancy boards 
in the various states. These accountants are licensed by the individual states 
and upon being so licensed may hold themselves out as “certified public 
accountants.”
The Institute has about 130,000 members in all states of the Union. 
While there is no legal requirement that certified public accountants be 
members of the Institute, a very large majority of them are. The Institute 
conducts extensive educational programs to assist members in upgrading 
their skills and in keeping current with developments in the profession.
The ultimate policy-making body of the Institute is the Council, con­
sisting of 255 members selected in part by state CPA societies and in part 
by election at large; other members serve by reason of their present or
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past offices in the Institute. The Board of Directors, a body of 18 members, 
has the continuing responsibility for the conduct of the Institute’s affairs.
SU M M ARY OF THE STAFF STUDY  
AND QUESTIONS RAISED
The staff study, while it makes a multitude of allegations and a number of 
recommendations, nonetheless may be briefly summarized. It alleges that 
the entire financial accounting and reporting process in the United States 
is dominated by a group of 8 accounting firms (referred to as the “Big 
Eight”), aided by another 7 firms smaller in size than the “Big Eight.” 
These 15 firms perform auditing services for a high proportion of the 
companies listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges. The 
staff study charges that, while accountants associated with these firms 
account for only 11 or 12 percent of the nation’s certified public accoun­
tants, they dominate the accounting profession and its principal organiza­
tion, the Institute, by their membership on the Institute’s governing and 
technical bodies. By domination of the Institute, it is alleged, they dominate 
the Financial Accounting Foundation, which is the “parent” body of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The FASB establishes 
financial accounting principles in the United States. Thus, through this 
chain, it is asserted, the “Big Eight” dominate the establishment of ac­
counting principles.
The staff study alleges that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(the SEC) has abdicated its statutory obligations by permitting the account­
ing profession to establish accounting principles and has by various 
actions encouraged this activity in the private sector.
The staff study alleges that accountants are not independent of their 
clients, that they have failed to assure that the financial statements issued 
to the public are accurate and reliable, and that therefore various drastic 
measures should be taken to assure public accountability by the profession.
Basically, the staff study poses the following questions to which we will 
respond (parenthetical references are to the numbered recommendations 
set forth in pages 20 to 24 of the staff study). The Institute has not re­
sponded to those recommendations as to which others might more appro­
priately comment.
1. Are present financial accounting standards (sometimes called ac­
counting principles) and the process by which they are established—private 
sector initiative accompanied by SEC oversight—adequate for protection 
of the public? (Recommendations 1, 2, 5, and 11.)
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2. Are present auditing standards and the process by which they are 
established adequate for protection of the public? (Recommendations 6, 
7, 8, and 10.)
3. Are auditors sufficiently independent of their clients? (Recommenda­
tion 8.)
4. Are the Institute and the accounting profession dominated by the 
large accounting firms? (Recommendations 4 and 12.)
5. Are present standards for determining the liability of auditors to 
public investors fair and sufficiently protective of the public? (Recom­
mendation 3.)
6. Is there excessive concentration in the supply of auditing and ac­
counting services to large publicly owned corporations? (Recommendations 
4 and 12.)
7. Is the disciplinary process that impacts the accounting profession 
sufficient? (Recommendations 8 and 14.)
8. Should the federal government refuse to engage for consulting 
work all firms that do auditing work for the government? (Recommenda­
tion 13.)
DISCUSSION
1. Are present financial accounting standards (sometimes called 
accounting principles) and the process by which they are 
established— private sector initiative accompanied by SEC 
oversight— adequate for protection of the public?
(Recommendations 1, 2, 5, and 11.)
The staff study charges that the process by which financial accounting 
standards are established is dominated by the “Big Eight” and that the 
failure of the profession and the SEC to insist upon elimination of alterna­
tive financial accounting standards has resulted in financial statements that 
are misleading to investors.
In the simplest terms, financial accounting standards are the rules 
governing how the information about business transactions is expressed 
and recorded in numbers, how the numbers are aggregated and arrayed, 
how they are reported, and how they are supplemented with textual dis­
closure to present the financial position of an enterprise at a particular 
moment in time, the results of its operations for a defined period, and the 
changes in its financial position during such period. Accounting is the 
process of applying financial accounting standards to the information 
about individual business transactions to produce financial statements which
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aggregate the information about individual transactions in an orderly 
manner. Accountants, therefore, are those who have specialized pro­
ficiency in the accounting process.
The accounting process necessarily involves making innumerable judg­
ments and estimates—the useful life of fixed assets such as a factory, and 
of intangible assets such as acquired goodwill, the collectibility of accounts 
receivables, the utility of inventories, and the appropriateness of tax ac­
cruals. This circumstance belies the common belief that financial statements 
are precise and exact, a notion that frequently results in criticisms of 
accountants when reasonable estimates prove in hindsight to have been off 
the mark.
The limitations of accounting and the accounting process were remarked 
upon recently by Professor George H. Sorter, chairman of the Department 
of Accounting, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York 
University:
Misconceptions about accounting abound. Totally unrealistic expectations 
of accounting’s role are held by many, including those that should know 
better. . . . Many expect accounting reports to “reveal” the value of a 
company, to establish the health or sickness of a company, to signal 
whether a stock is a good or bad investment. But that is not and cannot 
be the proper role of accounting. . . .
Accounting provides complex information to be used in conjunction with 
other information. Decision makers then, based on their individual judg­
ments, individual preferences and individual expectations, determine the 
value, health and prospects of a company project. . . .
It is somewhat strange that a world that has reluctantly accepted a prob­
lematic weather forecast expects accounting reports to provide definitive 
forecasts of whether it will rain or shine on a particular company. . . .
Not all significant economic activities can be communicated by accounting 
reports, and the user, in order not to be misled, must know which activities 
are included (New York Times, March 6, 1977, Sec. 3, p. 12).
Financial reporting standards are not “laws” or “givens” waiting to be 
discovered by a discerning eye, like the laws of physical science. Financial 
accounting standards are conventions—ways agreed on or determined by 
custom or authority—of measuring, combining, and stating information 
about business transactions. There is no such thing as an absolutely right 
or an absolutely wrong financial accounting standard. There will never 
be a system of financial accounting standards that is complete and im­
mutable. There are continuing changes in the business practices that pro-
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duce the information which in turn is organized and communicated by 
the application of financial accounting standards. For example, when 
franchising became a common business practice, franchisors applied 
then accepted accounting practices to increase income by immediately 
including franchise fees payable in the future. New financial accounting 
standards had to be developed to arrange the resulting information and 
communicate it in a manner that was not misleading—and standards 
were established by publication of an authoritative Institute guide. Until 
new standards were developed and promulgated, accountants relied on 
existing standards which had not been designed to deal with these innova­
tions, since previously they had not been encountered frequently.
Before the 1930s, the efforts of the accounting profession to establish 
financial accounting standards received little support from other private or 
governmental groups. However, even before the 1929 crash, but with 
accelerating speed thereafter, members of the accounting profession were 
joined by the New York Stock Exchange and others in efforts to improve 
the integrity of published financial statements. The Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 hastened and strengthened this 
process by giving to the newborn Securities and Exchange Commission 
broad powers to prescribe the content and forms of presentation of financial 
information in documents filed with it.
In 1938, after considerable study and internal debate, the SEC adopted 
Accounting Series Release No. 4. This stated that the Commission would 
accept in filings with it financial statements prepared in accordance with 
standards for which there was substantial authoritative support if the Com­
mission had not expressed a contrary policy. In 1939 the Committee on 
Accounting Procedures was organized by the Institute for the explicit 
purpose of developing accounting principles.
By the mid-fifties, the absence of sufficient research and a theoretical 
framework was recognized as hampering the work of the Committee. The 
Accounting Principles Board (the APB) was launched by the Institute in 
1959 with a mandate that placed heavy emphasis on research and the 
articulation of fundamentals. Largely as a result of pressures for the 
resolution of urgent practical day-to-day problems, compliance with the 
research portion of its mandate gradually diminished, as is described by the 
Report of the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles issued in 
March 1972 (pp. 29-35). Out of this report came the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board. It is fair to say that with respect to every major criticism 
leveled at the APB a meaningful response was incorporated in the makeup 
and the procedures of the FASB.
This shift of responsibility for the establishment of accounting standards
16
represented a major, even revolutionary, shift. The Institute and practicing 
accountants no longer have final authority over the establishment of ac­
counting standards. This authority now rests with the FASB, which was 
intended to be, and is, independent of the Institute. Under FASB proce­
dures, the Institute is no different from any other group having opinions 
about financial accounting standards: It responds to FASB invitations to 
comment and is often disappointed, as are others, that its advice does not 
prevail.
Less than four years since its creation, the FASB is now being assailed 
by impatient critics. Its purported shortcomings, such as alleged slowness 
in coming to grips with important issues, are well publicized. Unfortunately, 
less well publicized have been its achievements. It has issued 20 drafts of 
proposed Statements, 14 Statements, 13 discussion memoranda, 18 Inter­
pretations and has held 14 public hearings. This might be compared with 
the work of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB), which was 
created in 1970 and on which the staff study has commented favorably: 18 
drafts of proposed Standards, 14 Standards, 2 Interpretations, and one 
public hearing to evaluate Standards issued previously. This is not to 
suggest that the record of the CASB is to be criticized: The comparison 
simply points up the laudable accomplishments of the FASB.
Further indication of the profession’s earnest efforts to develop financial 
accounting standards is the fact that the FASB’s predecessors published 82 
Opinions and Bulletins, as well as numerous Interpretations. These, to­
gether with the FASB’s pronouncements, constitute the most extensive 
body of authoritative pronouncements on financial accounting standards 
in the world.
These achievements have by no means been easy. The FASB’s second 
Statement, requiring the immediate write-off of research and development 
costs, although highly controversial, was, in the eyes of most, courageous. 
Statement No. 8, which requires immediate reflection of the impact of 
currency fluctuations on financial positions and operations, has drawn 
almost unanimous criticism from those most affected—American multina­
tional enterprises. These and other examples amply demonstrate the 
independence of the FASB in its decision making. The active agenda of 
the Board is studded with controversial and difficult topics: A 360-page 
discussion memorandum on the conceptual framework for financial ac­
counting and reporting has been published, and a 400-page discussion 
memorandum on accounting and reporting for extractive industries has 
also been published; public hearings have been scheduled on both of these 
problems.
The Institute is not aware of any evidence that any Statement or Inter­
pretation has been influenced by the prior affiliations of Board members,
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by their membership in the Institute, by dependence of the FASB on the 
Financial Accounting Foundation for fund raising, by members’ expecta­
tions of future employment in the profession, or by any other consideration 
antagonistic to sound financial reporting.
When the alleged shortcomings of the FASB are fully cataloged, there 
is no evidence that the job of determining financial accounting standards 
could better be done by a governmental body. Would the job be done 
more quickly? If so, it would be at the expense of the careful research, 
analysis, and opportunity for public hearings that have preceded FASB 
pronouncements. Would the determinations of a governmental standard­
setting group be solely concerned with fair and full disclosure and protec­
tion of investors? Or would such determinations become infected with 
other considerations? Would a governmental body have decided to re­
quire a different approach to accounting for research and development to 
assist small business without concern for the effect of such a determination 
on investors in publicly held companies? (See p. 171 of the staff study, 
where this is intimated.)
The Financial Accounting Foundation, the parent organization of the 
FASB, has responded to the criticisms of the FASB. It has organized a 
committee to examine the structure and operations of the Board. This 
committee has interviewed extensively about 100 people who have had 
experience with the financial reporting process—accountants, businessmen, 
attorneys, government officials, educators, and many others—to secure a 
clear notion of the manner in which the work of the FASB is perceived and 
the ways in which it might be changed to better serve the public interest. 
This committee expects to report by the end of April.
As stated earlier, since 1934 the standard-setting process has been sub­
ject to the oversight of the SEC. An example of both the SEC’s willingness 
to override pronouncements of the profession’s standard-setting body when 
it thought such was appropriate and the hazards of expanding the control 
of the federal government over the establishment of financial accounting 
standards is seen in the lengthy controversy over accounting for the in­
vestment credit.
The investment credit is a credit against income taxes of a percentage of 
the purchase price of equipment purchased by a business. From its in­
ception, controversy raged among businessmen and their accountants 
concerning the manner in which this tax credit should be handled: Some 
urged strongly that the effect on income should be spread over the life 
of the equipment purchased, while others urged equally strongly that 
the favorable effect on income should be reflected totally in the year of 
purchase.
In December 1962, following the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962,
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which included provision for the investment credit, the APB determined 
that the fairest presentation to investors would be spreading the effect of 
the credit over the life of the equipment. However, the SEC adopted a rule 
that either method could be used by those filing documents with the SEC, 
after which the APB retreated from its position and followed the SEC.
The controversy was rekindled in 1971 by the Revenue Act of 1971. This 
act again provided for an investment credit. This time Congress pre­
empted both the SEC and the profession by decreeing legislatively that no 
one could require for the purpose of financial reports to any federal 
agency the use of any particular method of accounting for the investment 
credit. Thus, in the single instance in which Congress has decreed financial 
accounting standards, it opted for the use of any of a variety of standards 
(it did not even confine the options to the two most commonly used). Thus, 
Congress encouraged the very practice of “principle shopping” that the 
staff of the subcommittee has castigated the profession for failing to 
eliminate: It permitted issuers to select from alternative principles the one 
that would increase reported income.
The staff also makes much of the “flexibility” of accounting and implies 
that a vast range of alternatives is available to management each year. 
While some accounting alternatives exist, managements do not get to 
pick and choose from alternatives each year as if from a menu. In the 
unusual event of a change in accounting method, management must justify 
the change as being to a preferable method and must spell out the full 
effect in the financial statements and to the SEC.
There is no evidence in the staff study—unless speculation may be con­
sidered evidence—that the present process, now less than four years old, 
will not meet the needs of the users of financial information, will not 
expeditiously reduce the accounting options available to corporations, or 
will not promote the interests of investors better than any other system 
that might be conceived. Notably lacking in the staff study and its appen­
dixes are complaints from users of financial information.
The staff study criticizes the profession for its adherence to the stand­
ard of “materiality”* (see p. 117 of the study) and charges that this 
results in misleading financial statements, particularly those of large com­
panies. The concept of materiality is imbedded in the statutes governing
* Materiality has been defined by the SEC in several rules, all of which are similar 
to Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933:
The term “material,” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of 
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters 
as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed 
before purchasing the security registered.
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financial disclosure and the rules of the SEC under those statutes. The 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require the 
disclosure of material information and predicate liability of various persons, 
including the auditors, on a misstatement of or the omission to state, a 
material fact. Furthermore, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
made this concept the touchstone of their considerations of the adequacy 
of financial statements and other disclosures.
The auditor must be guided by the determinations of the courts and the 
SEC as to materiality. The concept is necessary to prevent financial state­
ments from becoming overloaded with information of no use to those to 
whom the statements are primarily directed—the investors. By thus avoid­
ing such excess, the financial statements are more useful. Even as con­
strained by this concept of materiality, financial statements of public 
companies are often criticized for containing too much information, perhaps 
thereby confusing investors.
If there were not such a concept as materiality to govern what should 
and should not be included in financial statements, neither management, 
nor auditors, nor courts would have any focus upon which to determine 
what should, and what need not, have been included in financial statements. 
Obviously, if an appropriate authority such as the SEC, the courts, or 
Congress determines that auditors should follow a standard different from 
that of materiality now imposed on them, they would make their judg­
ments accordingly. But regardless of what label is put on it, any system 
of disclosure must include a criterion to determine what should be in­
cluded in financial statements; otherwise every snippet of paper a corpora­
tion had would have to be published, resulting in nothing but confusion to 
investors. It should be noted that the FASB has done an extensive study of 
materiality, has published a discussion memorandum, and plans to issue 
a standard on the subject.
The staff study (p. 185) contrasts the cost of operating the Cost Account­
ing Standards Board with the cost of operating the FASB. This comparison, 
of course, ignores a number of distinctions. First, the CASB is concerned 
with establishing standards for one category of financial information, 
namely, costs, while the FASB addresses itself to all categories of such 
information—costs, revenues, assets, liabilities, and equity. Second, the 
CASB is only concerned with setting these limited standards for a limited 
group—certain government contractors; the FASB, on the other hand, 
establishes standards for all businesses—not just for those with govern­
ment contracts, not even just for those publicly held. The complexity and 
scope of the FASB’s task compared with that of the CASB are apparent. 
Finally, as seen earlier the output of the FASB in four years has far 
exceeded that of the CASB in seven.
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In addition to the criticism of the FASB in the staff study, Senator 
Metcalf’s transmittal letter states as one of his principal concerns the 
delegation by the SEC of its authority over accounting and auditing 
matters to “private groups.”
The Commission has allowed the accounting profession, and the bodies 
the profession has organized, to take the initiative in establishing accounting 
standards. This was done after considerable debate within the Commission 
by the publication of Accounting Series Release No. 4, and was reconfirmed 
in 1973, when the Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. 150, 
by which it announced the policy of not recognizing principles which con­
flict with pronouncements of the FASB, except in the unusual circum­
stances—stated in Rule 203 of the Code of Professional Ethics of the 
Institute—where the use of another principle is necessary to prevent the 
statements from being misleading.
There is no evidence in the staff study, or elsewhere to our knowledge, 
that would justify the conclusion that had the Commission not adopted 
such a policy the quality of accounting and auditing would be different or 
better. Furthermore, this relationship between the Commission and the 
accounting profession has had the express or implied approval of chairmen 
and commissioners since 1938 with no discernible objection, of all chief 
accountants of the SEC since then, of virtually all preparers of financial 
information and of virtually all users of information. In short, the belief 
has been virtually universal that this relationship has been effective and 
protective of the public interest.
This practice has of course had the advantage of using the talents and 
experience of innumerable practitioners in the standard-setting process, at 
a cost incalculable but very substantial. If the entire activity of the FASB 
and its predecessors and the auditing standard-setting bodies had been 
carried out by a governmental body, the taxpayers would have borne a 
significant financial burden through the years.
However, this relationship has not by any means kept the SEC on the 
sidelines. Since its inception it has published over 200 accounting releases 
(78 of them since 1972); in late 1975 it commenced issuing staff in­
terpretations based on experiences in processing filings with the Com­
mission and inquiries from issuers and accountants, and thus far 14 have 
been published; it adopted Regulation S-X, which sets forth requirements 
with respect to the contents and format of financial statements filed with 
the Commission by various types of enterprises and which it has con­
tinuously amended to reflect changing needs. It is fair to say that the 
Commission has by rule making, by enforcement activity, and in other 
ways been quite aggressive in recent years in meeting its responsibility 
with respect to accounting matters.
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Further, the Commission has maintained close liaison with the standard­
setting bodies and has made known its views with respect to accounting 
principles and auditing practices. This liaison has clearly influenced the 
conduct of the private bodies.
The Commission and its staff have not been reluctant to take action when 
they believed the action taken by the private bodies inappropriate or unduly 
delayed. Thus in 1963 the Commission overrode the Accounting Principles 
Board with respect to accounting for the investment credit. Again in 1973, 
the Commission adopted disclosure requirements with respect to leases, 
notwithstanding the issuance of an Opinion on the subject by the Account­
ing Principles Board and the pendency of that matter on the agenda of the 
FASB. In 1975, the Commission became aware that in many cases income 
from early extinguishment of debt was unduly inflating the earnings of 
some issuers because existing APB Opinions required it to be reported as 
ordinary income. It urged the FASB to take action, suggesting that other­
wise it would take action itself. The result was FASB Statement No. 4, 
which satisfied the concerns of the Commission. Similarly, when in an 
exposure draft the FASB appeared to favor price level accounting, the 
Commission took steps to require disclosure in footnotes to the financial 
statements of larger issuers of the replacement costs of inventories and fixed 
assets to reflect the effects of inflation.
An example of the manner in which the FASB and the SEC interface, 
and in which the SEC exercises its responsibility, is the release on Decem­
ber 2, 1976, of FASB Statement No. 13, pertaining to the accounting for 
leases. This provided for prospective application of its principles until 
1981, when retroactive application will be required. The SEC is proposing 
that these principles, which it implicitly endorses, be applied immediately 
to practically all leases regardless of when they were entered into, thus 
requiring the application of Statement No. 13 sooner than intended by 
the FASB.
It is fair to say that the Commission and its staff have not been supine 
or indifferent to the manner in which private bodies have dealt with 
standard setting. To a greater extent than may appear from simply read­
ing Accounting Series Releases Nos. 4 and 150, the Commission has 
actively overseen the development of accounting and auditing standards.
2. Are present auditing standards and the process by which 
they are established adequate for protection of the public?
(Recommendations 6, 7, 8, and 10.)
The staff study charges that the process of establishing auditing standards 
has been dominated by the “Big Eight” and that the standards have not 
been sufficiently rigorous.
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A critical distinction should be noted between auditing and accounting. 
While intimately related, they are quite different. As mentioned earlier, 
accounting is the process by which financial accounting standards are 
applied to business transactions to produce financial statements. Auditing 
is the process by which someone other than the preparer determines whether 
the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with appropriate 
accounting standards.*
Obviously someone performing the audit function must have an intimate 
acquaintance with the financial accounting standards that were used in 
preparing the financial statements under review; otherwise, he would be 
unable to express an opinion that the statements were prepared in ac­
cordance with standards indicated as having been followed. Also, there 
is general agreement that for an auditor to perform his function effectively 
he must become familiar with the enterprise whose statements are being 
examined, particularly the system of internal accounting controls; the 
adequacy of this system will in large measure determine the nature and 
scope of the auditor’s procedures.
The auditing process consists of two parts: (1) Performing the various 
procedures and tests necessary to form an opinion about whether the 
financial statements are properly presented, and (2) reporting on the 
financial statements as the result of that examination.
The standards by which independent auditors make their examination, 
the procedures they use, and the contents of their report have evolved 
over a period of time under the aegis of the committees of the Institute. 
Ten basic generally accepted auditing standards are contained in Statement 
on Auditing Standards No. 1 (in view of the staff study’s allegation that 
the “Big Eight” dominate the establishment of standards, it should be 
noted these most important basic standards were adopted by the member­
ship of the Institute in the late forties). Interpretations of those standards 
are proposed and adopted by the Auditing Standards Executive Com­
mittee of the Institute as business and economic development require. 
For instance, in response to a perceived need, the Committee has recently 
issued two statements—one relating to the detection of errors or irregular­
ities in financial statements and the other relating to illegal acts by 
clients. Another statement has been proposed that would require the 
auditor to inform management of significant weaknesses of internal
* A more technical definition is contained in Paragraph 110.01 of Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 1 published by the Institute in 1972:
The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the inde­
pendent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which 
they present the financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial 
position in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
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accounting controls discerned during an audit, thus making mandatory a 
practice now followed by most auditors.
The principal, though not the exclusive, purpose of the audit is to 
express an opinion on the financial statements prepared by management, 
thereby contributing to their credibility. Without the expectation that a 
disinterested party would test the reliability of the statements, management 
might be tempted to prepare its financial reports in a self-serving fashion. 
Thus, the independence of the auditor is critical to the process.
Also of importance in conducting a proper audit are such matters as 
the training of auditors, experience in performing audits, sufficient per­
sonnel (often audits of large companies require hundreds of professionals), 
supervision of the audit staff, controls to assure adherence to standards, 
appropriate reviews by persons not involved in the actual audit work 
itself, and other steps to remove as much as possible subjective elements 
from the process and the report.
The auditor’s examination involves the use of various methods to 
secure information concerning the numbers and explanations reflected 
in the financial statements under review and the transactions which they 
summarize. An auditor could review every transaction, regardless of size, 
and obtain objective evidence of its elements—in effect, retrace trans­
action by transaction the entire operations of the company for the period 
under consideration. Obviously this would be inordinately expensive; 
simply reflecting on what would be involved to review one’s own trans­
actions during a year and to secure confirmation from external sources 
that each was properly recorded on one’s financial records suggests what 
an overwhelming task this would be for a large business enterprise.
To prevent audit costs from being grossly excessive in relation to 
benefits, the accounting profession through the years has developed 
various methods of testing the information reflected in the financial state­
ments. These techniques, while not giving the same assurance as an audit 
of every transaction, have provided in the combined experience of the 
profession a high degree of assurance in determining whether matters 
happened as represented. For instance, in testing the accuracy of accounts 
receivable reflected in financial statements, a standard procedure is to 
ask debtors whether the amounts shown on the books of the company 
being examined are accurate. From experience, auditors know they will 
not get a 100 percent response to confirmation requests; also, by ex­
perience, they know that with a sufficiently high response, together with 
other procedures, they may reasonably conclude whether the accounts 
receivable figure is reasonably accurate.
Similarly, they observe the counting of selected inventory items. With 
respect to reviewing some items, such as cash or marketable securities, a
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more reliable determination can be made, because of their nature, by actual 
counts, or bank or depository confirmations.
Methods of external checking have been developed with respect to 
virtually every item subject to such verification in financial statements.
If, as can be demonstrated, auditing standards have through the years 
become increasingly demanding, how is it that there have been audits that 
did not detect and report that the financial statements were not properly 
prepared or properly reflective of transactions, that in some cases they 
concealed illegal management conduct and even fraud?
First, of course, auditing is done by human beings and involves a 
multitude of “judgment calls” with respect to such matters as classifica­
tion of items, reasonableness of management estimates, bona fides of 
transactions, and the like; hence, there is ever present in the auditing 
process the danger of a human error, a mistake in judgment, a simple 
oversight—errors that can occur, and do occur, in every profession and 
every human enterprise and undertaking. While controls, training, and 
supervision may reduce them, errors are always possible in human 
endeavors.
In a number of cases, faulty financial statements resulted where auditing 
procedures to identify and test certain types of transactions, such as 
transactions between related parties, had not been developed because the 
phenomenon had not been widely encountered or a source of misleading 
financial statements; hence, individual auditors were not aware of the need 
to search for such transactions. In every such case where it has appeared 
that absence of sufficiently articulated auditing standards and procedures 
has contributed to a problem, the Institute’s Auditing Standards Executive 
Committee has actively considered and issued pronouncements to provide 
the needed guidance. Even in the absence of business failures or mis­
leading financial statements pointing to a problem, the Committee has, 
relying on the combined experience of the members of the Institute, issued 
pronouncements to head off possible problems.
However, of greater importance than human failure or a lack of stand­
ards is the danger of deception practiced by unscrupulous managements 
on the auditor in a way that defies discovery by even the most skilled 
investigator. These deceptions have been present in several of the allegedly 
“bad” audits.
The starting point of any audit is the books and records of the company, 
although this is not the end point, by any means. Thus, to take the 
simplest case, if a transaction was never entered on the books of the 
company, the auditor might only become aware of it through happen­
stance. In many cases, the misconduct which has been exposed was 
committed completely outside the books and records of the company;
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hence, the auditor had no starting point. In other instances, the trans­
actions were entered on the books, but the entry was misleading and 
misrepresented the nature of the transaction. For example, a bribe to a 
foreign official might have been labeled as a commission for sales services, 
a fact that could not be apparent to the auditor unless he interrogated the 
foreign official. Even then, he would not be likely to receive reliable 
information from the recipient of a bribe. Of course, if management 
colludes with a third party to mislead the auditor (as, for instance, by 
causing third parties to give false responses to auditor inquiries), the 
verification procedure is frustrated, and there generally is no practical way 
available to the auditor to detect such collusion.
In short, management fraud and misconduct are rarely, if ever, apparent 
on the books of the company. Artful entries usually are designed to have 
the appearance of being routine and proper to escape the eye of the auditor. 
In virtually every instance in which an auditor has been faulted, it has 
been the consequence of financial statements improperly prepared by 
management. In other words, the auditor, along with the investors, has 
been the victim of a management fraud—misrepresentation by the man­
agement of the company, deliberately concealed in some fashion from the 
auditor.
Some of these falsifications could be detected if audit techniques were 
extended beyond those now common. This would involve substantial 
additional cost, leading to the critical question whether the additional cost 
would be justified by the benefit to investors and creditors. Had procedures 
more explicitly designed to determine whether the sort of misconduct that 
has claimed headlines for the last two years been in use in the past, the 
cost to American industry, and ultimately consumers, might have been 
in the billions over the years. To date, out of some 10,000 companies 
that report to the SEC, about 300 have disclosed improprieties, including 
illegal or questionable payments. Some were not even clearly illegal or 
improper. The primary issue, then, is not the failure of auditors; rather, 
it is the cost American industry and American society are willing to bear 
to procure the benefits that would derive from a significantly expanded audit.
The principal purpose of auditors, particularly those of publicly held 
companies, is to provide an additional measure of credibility to financial 
statements for the benefit of investors and creditors. If an auditor finds 
evidence of illegality he has an obligation to apprise the appropriate people 
within the company of such fact and consult with counsel concerning 
possible other steps; if his legal duty is to inform others, then he must do 
so. The notion, however, that the auditor’s primary function is the deter­
mination of the extent to which the audited entity has conformed to law, 
as suggested by the staff study, is indeed novel and at odds with the
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entire history of auditing and the understanding of the business and pro­
fessional community. The auditor is simply not equipped by professional 
training or otherwise to make the sort of sophisticated legal judgments 
such a distortion of his role would entail.
A number of projects are currently under way that will improve on 
the effectiveness of audits:
1. During the last session of Congress, and again in the current one, 
legislation has been introduced that would make it a criminal offense to 
misrepresent to an auditor, to fail to maintain adequate internal controls, 
to fail to maintain accurate books and records, and to falsify corporate 
accounting records. The SEC has proposed similar requirements by rule 
(Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13185). It might be noted that 
such requirements have been of long standing in other countries. For 
example, it has long been unlawful in Great Britain to make misrepresenta­
tions to an auditor. Obviously the dangers of criminal prosecution will 
affect the conduct of management; to the extent it does, auditors will be 
assisted and the effectiveness of audits will be improved.*
2. The Auditing Standards Executive Committee has adopted two 
Statements (Statements on Accounting Standards Nos. 16 and 17) to 
guide auditors in detecting and dealing with illegal conduct, management 
fraud, and the like. While these pronouncements are criticized in the 
staff study as inadequate, these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding 
of matters in the proposed pronouncements that have been clarified in the 
final pronouncements.
3. The Institute in October 1974 organized a commission under the 
chairmanship of Manuel F. Cohen, a former chairman of the SEC, “to 
consider how well independent auditors are meeting their present responsi­
bilities, whether their responsibilities should be changed and how the 
nature and limitations of those responsibilities can best be communicated 
to users of the auditor’s work” (Statement of Issues: Scope and Organization
* The Institute has favored making it a criminal offense for persons associated with 
a company under audit to misrepresent in writing a fact to an auditor; it opposed 
those parts of the proposed legislation which would have made oral misrepresentations 
criminal because of the uncertainties that attend such communications, and which 
would have extended the prohibition to third persons because of the danger that fear 
of criminal penalties would deter sources of information such as banks, debtors, and 
others from supplying information to auditors on a voluntary basis as they now do. 
The Institute believes the SEC’s proposed rule designed to accomplish substantially 
the same results as the proposed legislation partially meets these concerns.
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of the Study of Auditors’ Responsibilities, p. 4). Only three of the seven 
members of this commission are practicing accountants. The others are a 
lawyer, a businessman, a financial analyst, and an educator. Notwith­
standing that this commission had published nothing official beyond a 
statement of the questions it proposes to address, the staff study rejected 
the possibility that good will come from it (pp. 119-120). The contrary 
may more confidently be asserted. Preliminary discussions with the 
commission suggest that it will, indeed, recommend significant expansions 
of auditors’ responsibilities and, given the times and the prestige and 
origins of the commission, its recommendations will be taken very seriously 
by the profession.
4. Virtually all firms, sensitive to the problems posed by the increasing 
complexity of business transactions and the rising expectations of the public, 
not to mention their own sense of professional responsibility, have tightened 
their quality controls, their supervision, their training, and their overall 
standards of performance. A random sampling of firms indicates that in 
the last five years the expenditures of such firms for quality control and 
training have at least doubled, while revenues from auditing have increased 
by between 50 and 70 percent.
5. The Institute has established a procedure and program for review 
of auditing firms by other auditing firms or by panels of other auditors 
appointed by the Institute, of the adequacy of the reviewed firms’ controls, 
supervision, and the overall manner in which they conduct their audits and 
other activities. At this writing most of the large firms have arranged for 
such reviews, and it is expected that many smaller size firms will undertake 
such programs. The staff study seeks to disparage this program by stating 
on pp. 114-115 that the review of one major firm which had been dis­
ciplined by the SEC gave the firm a clean bill of health. The staff study 
neglects to mention that the review followed by some three years the first 
charge against the firm and that at least from the time of the first charge the 
firm had undertaken extensive measures to avoid problems; knowing that, 
it is not surprising that when the review was conducted it would justly 
find that the firm’s standards and adherence to them were satisfactory. 
Obviously a firm conducting a review of another firm undertakes a con­
siderable responsibility, one which could result in severe consequences if 
it concluded there existed no deficiencies in the examined firm and later 
the conclusion proved to be wrong.
6. In almost half the states, legislation has been enacted, largely at the 
instigation of the profession, requiring participation by accountants in 
continuing education programs as a condition of retaining their licenses; 
in all other states, the state CPA societies either favor such legislation or 
have voluntarily adopted such programs.
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There is nothing in the staff study that would suggest that a governmental 
body developing auditing standards could more effectively mandate good 
supervision and control, thwart negligence and poor judgment, enforce 
more diligently compliance with accepted auditing standards and pro­
cedures, or deter more effectively management deception. An alerted 
profession is expending a great amount of its resources toward these ends 
and can be expected to continue to do this in the future. In fact, a govern­
mental agency might be less effective, since it would not have as readily 
available the experience of the profession in identifying problem areas. 
Obviously, with the initiative and responsibility for the strengthening of 
auditing standards in the private sector, auditors are more alert to their 
responsibility to anticipate problems and, hence, are more willing to 
cooperate with the standard-setting group in developing standards that 
deal with potential problems.
3. Are auditors sufficiently independent of their clients?
(Recommendation 8.)
As mentioned above, integral to the effectiveness of the audit process is 
the independence of the auditors. The staff study maintains that auditors 
are not independent of their clients for two reasons: (1) They sometimes 
perform services other than accounting and auditing for their clients, and 
(2) they have testified in an advocacy role before Congress and other 
governmental bodies in a manner favorable to their clients’ interests.
The standards for independence are established and enforced by the 
Institute, the state boards of accountancy, the state CPA societies, and the 
SEC. In addition to the standards established by such bodies, many firms 
have additional procedures and rules governing permissible and impermis­
sible relationships. These are rigidly enforced using very thorough and 
sophisticated systems.
Independence essentially is a state of mind and not something that can 
be measured with precision. The SEC in Accounting Series Releases (Nos. 
2, 22, 44, 47, 81, 112, and 126) and the profession’s Code of Ethics and 
attendant literature have articulated stringent standards proscribing certain 
activities and relationships of auditors with clients. These standards serve 
a twofold purpose: First, they prohibit relationships that might, in the 
common experience of men, prejudice the judgment of an auditor; and 
second, compliance with them provides some measure of external evi­
dence that an independent relationship exists. Of course, notwithstanding 
these strictures and their enforcement (the SEC has been extremely un­
yielding in enforcing its requirements), it is possible for various reasons 
that an auditor’s judgment may not be wholly objective. However, it is
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noteworthy that, with extremely few exceptions, the cases brought against 
members of the accounting profession in recent years did not suggest the 
slightest evidence that any auditor had any of the forbidden relationships, 
had his judgment suborned by accepting any benefit from the client other 
than customary fees, or had in any other way permitted his independence 
to be impaired.
In the preparation and review of financial statements there are inevitably 
going to be matters as to which reasonable men differ, and in the life of an 
auditor there will be occasions when management personnel will for a 
variety of reasons urge strongly on an auditor the propriety of their pro­
posed accounting judgment as opposed to that which the auditor thinks is 
right. These disagreements would exist even if every accounting principle 
were clear, even if every situation were governed by a single principle, and 
even if auditing standards and procedures anticipated every problem. Even 
if the staff study’s recommendations were fully implemented, all elements 
of judgment would remain, and there would continue to be questions such 
as the estimated life of physical assets, the extent to which matters were 
material, the allowances which should be made for bad debts, the account­
ing period in which certain types of income should be recognized, and so on.
When disagreements arise between management and the auditors, they 
are sometimes resolved in a manner that is satisfactory to both parties. 
This is not, as suggested by some, prima facie evidence of a lack of in­
dependence on the part of the auditor; it is almost invariably the con­
sequence of deeper inquiry by the auditor into the facts, and thoughtful 
response by both parties to persuasive arguments.
Notwithstanding a praiseworthy record of independence, various 
measures are being taken to strengthen even further the independence of 
auditors:
1. The SEC requires that when there has been a change of auditors, 
there must be disclosure in a filing with the Commission of any disagree­
ment between the auditor and management over an accounting principle or 
practice, financial statement disclosure, or auditing procedures (Item 4, 
Form 8-K). Thus, a management may no longer dismiss an auditor over 
an accounting disagreement with no publicity other than the presence of a 
different auditor’s opinion in the next annual report. These filings are 
often discussed in the press. Obviously this requirement strengthens con­
siderably the ability of auditors to withstand management pressures.
2. The increased incidence of litigation has unquestionably caused 
auditors to be more sensitive to the dangers of succumbing to pressures 
from management. With increasing numbers of investors alert to possible
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deficiencies in financial reporting, every auditor realizes that the penalties 
for any departure from sound standards or any subordinating of judgment 
to that of a client may entail not only financial loss to his firm, but also 
professional disaster for himself and possibly criminal prosecution and even 
(as happened in a case recently) imprisonment.
3. The SEC has increasingly monitored the adequacy of audit per­
formance and brought injunctive and administrative proceedings when it 
believed there had been shortcomings in the work of auditors. In recent 
years, the Commission has more frequently named accountants and ac­
counting firms in injunctive actions and in administrative proceedings to 
determine whether they should be allowed to continue to practice before 
the Commission. Also, the discipline of litigation is not confined to the 
SEC. During this period, many suits were brought in the United States 
charging accounting firms with deficiencies in their professional work. 
Quite obviously the overhanging threat of SEC or private party litigation 
is a strong influence in directing the profession toward more stringent stand­
ards of independence, competence, and adherence to sound practices.
4. Increasingly, companies have set up audit committees as a part of the 
structure of their boards of directors. Such committees usually consist 
exclusively of outside directors. A recent report summarized in the Wall 
Street Journal (January 19, 1977, p. 6) stated that in the past five years, 
among 646 companies surveyed, the number with audit committees had 
increased from 42 percent to 93 percent. It is noteworthy that in 1967, 
long before the current concern with this question, the Institute recom­
mended that companies establish independent audit committees.
The audit committee performs several functions. It provides a means by 
which the auditors can discuss candidly with outside directors problems they 
have discerned in the company, the quality of internal controls, pressures 
from management, improper conduct they have found, and anything else 
they think may affect the financial statements of the company. The members 
of the audit committee have the opportunity to assess the competence of the 
auditors, the adequacy of their procedures, and the strength of their in­
dependence. Both directors and auditors have expressed satisfaction with 
the functioning of these committees, and the evidence is persuasive that the 
presence of an audit committee in a company strengthens considerably the 
audit function and the independence of the auditors.
The importance of audit committees is underlined by the request of SEC 
Chairman Roderick M. Hills to the New York Stock Exchange that it 
modify its listing requirements to compel listed companies to have in-
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dependent audit committees. In that letter, dated May 11, 1976, Chair­
man Hills said:
The existence of an audit committee that meets privately with the outside 
auditors to discuss the scope of the audit, questions arising during the 
audit, including disputes with management, and that has access to the 
corporate financial information, is an important part of our effort to 
maintain the credibility of our system of corporate self-regulation.
In response to this request the Exchange has adopted an amendment to 
its listing agreement requiring that after July 1, 1978, each listed company 
have an audit committee consisting of directors independent of manage­
ment.
5. As discussed above, firms have strengthened and are continuing to 
strengthen their internal procedures to assure the quality and independence 
of their auditing work.
The staff study asserts that the independence of accounting firms in per­
forming audits is compromised because they render various consulting 
services to their clients in addition to accounting and auditing. Not only is 
independence not compromised, but in many cases the quality of the audit 
is enhanced. Often the performance of these services provides the firm 
with a better understanding of the company, the adequacy of its internal 
controls, the calibre of personnel, and other information which assists 
materially in the auditing process. Further, there is not in the staff study 
the slightest evidence that these activities have in any way actually affected 
the quality of financial reporting or the independence of any auditor.
The staff study charges that lack of auditor independence is further 
evidenced by the fact that accountants often testify before public bodies 
advocating positions that are favorable to their clients. Sometimes ac­
countants testify explicitly at the request of clients. However, their testi­
mony is the fruit, not of a client interest, but of a conviction born of 
experience and professional insight. When they so testify they are not 
tools of their clients. Clients are by no means homogeneous in their 
opinions on any subject; hence, quite often a CPA’s expressed opinion may 
parallel the opinion of some clients but offend others. Therefore, the 
charge that they do this as advocates of client interests rather than from 
convictions concerning the issues is without basis in fact.
It is not surprising that in many instances professionals deeply concerned 
with financial matters would find their own views corresponding to those 
of some of their clients; to suggest that because they have such clients 
they should remain silent concerning issues about which they have expert 
knowledge is not only to deny them basic rights but also to deny public 
bodies the benefits of their expertise. The implication of the staff study 
would seem to be that, under the changes recommended, accountants
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would no longer be allowed to express their opinions on matters they 
deem of public concern or that might affect them or their clients, a 
restraint we suggest Congress would be loath to impose.
4. Are the Institute and the accounting profession 
dominated by the large accounting firms?
(Recommendations 4 and 12.)
The staff study asserts that, by their domination of the Institute, the 
“Big Eight” dominate the FASB and the senior and other committees of 
the Institute. The charge of domination of the Institute is based on the 
assertion that, while CPAs associated with “Big Eight” firms are only 15 
percent of the membership of the Institute, their participation on Institute 
committees is much higher. The relevant facts are considerably different. 
Among the members of the Institute only about 75,000 are engaged in 
practice; of these, about 27 percent are affiliated with “Big Eight” firms 
and about 33 percent are associated with the 15 firms discussed in the 
study. These statistics are roughly in the same proportion as representation 
on the Institute’s Council, its ultimate policy-making body, in which “Big 
Eight” members are less than one-third, and the 15 largest firms’ members 
number about two-fifths; and on the Institute’s Board, in which “Big 
Eight” members are one-third.
It also is not surprising that the large firms participate in some of the 
activities of the Institute more actively than other accountants. Large pub­
licly held companies, while sharing some problems and concerns with 
privately held enterprises, tend to have the full range of accounting and 
auditing problems, including some which are unique to themselves. Thus, it 
is to be expected that accounting firms which audit publicly held companies 
would be more willing to commit their personnel and their resources to the 
activities and committees of the Institute most concerned with those prob­
lems. Furthermore, because of their size and internal research capabilities, 
those firms tend to be better equipped to commit manpower to this effort 
than firms with smaller staffs.
Finally, to the extent that the large firms influence the activities of the 
Institute and its committees, nowhere in the staff study is there evidence 
that this has been adverse to the development of sound accounting and 
auditing standards or the public interest. There is no evidence that had 
the participation of large firms in the Institute been confined to an amount 
exactly proportionate to their membership, accounting principles and 
auditing standards would be any better; a sounder argument can be made 
that they would not have been as good because of the lesser availability 
of the personnel and other resources of the large firms which assist the 
work of the committees and the Institute.
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The simple fact is that the “Big Eight” are eight distinct firms who seldom 
speak with a single voice. An examination of the firms’ submissions to the 
FASB, the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, and the SEC in 
response to proposals by those bodies shows dramatically the varying views 
and approaches among the firms, often concerning very basic issues.
Similarly, the suggestion that the large firms dominate the FASB through 
the Institute is belied by the fact that the Institute, like innumerable others 
interested in financial accounting standards, routinely submits responses to 
the FASB’s discussion memoranda and exposure drafts which are often 
at variance with the comments of the “Big Eight” firms. A comparison 
of those submissions with the final opinions of the FASB shows that often 
the suggestions and criticisms of the Institute are rejected by the FASB! 
Clearly, if the Institute were the minion of the “Big Eight” and the FASB 
were the slave of the Institute these divergences would not occur.
5. Are present standards for determining the liability of auditors 
to public investors fair and sufficiently protective?
(Recommendation 3.)
The staff criticizes the recent Supreme Court decision, Hochfelder v. 
Ernst & Ernst, and calls for its legislative reversal. In that case the Court 
held that for an auditor to have liability under Rule 10b-5 (the SEC’s 
rule prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative activity), it must be 
shown that his conduct was worse than negligent; it must be shown that 
he had an intention to deceive, defraud, or manipulate.
First, it should be noted that this decision has no effect whatsoever on 
the liabilities that relate to the registration of securities under the Securities 
Act of 1933 for the purpose of public distribution; under that act auditors 
may still be held liable if they fail to establish that “after a reasonable in­
vestigation, [they had] reasonable ground to believe and did believe” that 
the financial statements included in a registration statement on their 
authority did not contain any materially false statement or omit any 
material fact required to be stated in the registration statement or necessary 
to make the statements made not misleading.
If an auditor knowingly participates in a client’s fraud, or, according to 
some courts of appeal since the Hochfelder decision, if the auditor is 
reckless, he may have huge liabilities to investors. Thus, the auditor con­
tinues, even under Hochfelder, to have a significant exposure to liability. 
For example, recently the liability of the auditors in the Equity Funding 
matter was settled—after the Hochfelder decision—for $39 million.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder did not determine the 
extent of the fault necessary to sustain a complaint by the SEC. Since 
Hochfelder, several courts of appeal have concluded that simple negligence 
is sufficient to sustain a complaint by the SEC alleging violation of the 
securities laws. Such actions, which can culminate in damaging injunctive 
relief, can have a profound impact on the reputation and prospects of an 
accountant and accounting firm.
Beyond that, when the question is not one of liability of the auditor to 
purchasers of securities in a registered offering, but rather the extent to 
which he should be liable to the vast number of people who trade securities 
in the market, there is a considerable question of equity and fairness.
The simple issue is this: Is it equitable, is it good policy, to subject an 
auditor to huge, perhaps even ruinous liabilities, as the consequence of a 
single negligent act? Accounting firms perform thousands of audits a year 
(over 10,000 audited financial statements are filed with the SEC annually, 
and it is estimated that the “Big Eight” conduct more than 65,000 audits 
annually). With only a few exceptions, these have provided significant 
protection to investors, creditors, and others who have the need to rely on 
them. Is it appropriate—is it fair—to make an accounting firm, made up of 
literally thousands of professionals, answer for the huge damages that may 
accrue as the consequence of the negligence of only one or a very few 
members of the firm?
The answer to this question was well stated by Judge (later Supreme 
Court Justice) Benjamin O. Cardozo in Ultramares v. Touche, decided by 
the New York Court of Appeals:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure 
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde­
terminate time to an indeterminate class. . . . The hazards of a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether 
a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these 
consequences.
Interestingly, the proposal to make harsher the liability exposure of 
auditors belies the concerns expressed by the staff report about an alleged 
lack of competition in the profession. The harsher the liability standards, 
the less able are small firms to bear the risk attendant upon an audit. 
How many small firms could suffer a $39 million settlement, even if 
covered by insurance, and survive? Small firms report that they have
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increasing difficulty in securing adequate insurance because they are not 
well known and do not have the resources of large firms. Thus, harsher 
standards of liability may further force publicly held corporations to 
engage the larger firms.
6. Is there excessive concentration in the supply of auditing and 
accounting services to large publicly owned corporations?
(Recommendations 4 and 12.)
The staff study suggests that accounting practice is too concentrated in 
the larger firms and that the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the Justice Department should investigate this matter.
Modern economic history, both in this country and abroad, has been 
characterized by the growth in size of corporations; the reasons for and 
social desirability of that growth are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
The growth of accounting firms has paralleled that corporate growth for 
a simple reason: To audit a major international industrial company requires 
a large organization. For instance, the audit of General Motors requires 
examination of records and other procedures to be done in approximately 
200 major accounting locations of which 150 are in this country and 50 
are outside the United States. Even for a much smaller company, the 
auditor must conduct audits at dozens of locations in this country and 
overseas. Most firms having clients with operations widespread geograph­
ically have expanded their activities correspondingly, in large measure 
to maintain the efficiency, consistency, and quality of their audit. Simply 
put, most small firms, confronted with the audit of a major company, 
would not have the resources to do the work.
Thus, it is not surprising that as corporations have grown, auditing firms 
have grown, and those structured to meet the needs of large companies have 
attracted large clients.
The remedies suggested by the staff study for the alleged concentration 
would in many cases diminish the quality of the audit and increase audit 
costs substantially. It is suggested that the auditing firms be rotated 
periodically. At the present time it is common practice for firms to rotate 
the personnel involved in an audit to assure fresh insights and preclude 
the development of relationships that might impair independence of judg­
ment. However, this is done in a manner that preserves the important 
continuity of knowledge of the company, its history, its personnel, and 
its audit problems. Understanding of the company, its internal controls, 
the way it keeps its books, its policies, and its personnel, is universally
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regarded as essential to the satisfactory performance of the audit. For 
instance, an authoritative work on auditing states:
The integrity and reliability of presentations in financial statements 
depend primarily on two things: (1) the effectiveness of the company’s 
accounting systems and the controls over them and (2) the fairness of its 
management’s estimates, valuations, and judgments reflected in the state­
ments. Thus, an auditor must understand not only a client’s accounting 
systems, but also enough about the client’s operations, management, and 
economic circumstances to be able to judge the fairness of estimates, 
valuations, and other judgments made. He must understand at least 
the following:
1. Accounting systems in use.
2. Systems of internal control.
3. Accounting principles used.
4. Characteristics of the operations of the client company that could have 
a financial or accounting impact.
5. Management policies and practices that could affect the reliability of 
financial and accounting controls and decisions.
6. Characteristics of the business environment that could affect financial 
statements.
7. Legal constraints, both present and potential, within which the enter­
prise must function (Montgomery’s Auditing, 9th ed., p. 6).
If auditors were rotated periodically, each firm new to a client would 
be at a disadvantage because of its lack of familiarity with the client and 
its financial practices and would need considerable time to achieve the 
knowledge of the company possessed by the replaced auditor. It is surely 
not without significance that in a large number of the suits which have 
involved auditors, the relationship between the auditor and the client had 
been of relatively recent origin. Rotation would deny the auditor the 
very valuable tool he acquires as he achieves familiarity with a corporation, 
its procedures, and its people. Furthermore, each time a firm is changed, 
there is the additional expense of the auditor’s familiarizing himself with 
the client and its procedures, an expense which would have to be borne 
by the client (ultimately, of course, by the public).
Increasingly the selection of auditors is being delegated to audit com­
mittees, which usually consist either entirely, or almost so, of outside 
directors. The staff study suggests that shareholders elect auditors by voting 
on competing firms. However, an audit committee, in continuous contact 
with the auditors, will obviously be in a far better position to judge the
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auditor’s performance than shareholders who would have a very limited 
basis on which to compare the current auditors of the corporation with a 
possible replacement.
Finally, contrary to the staff study’s charges about concentration, the 
number of smaller firms in which Institute members practice has in the last 
six years increased from about 9,500 to about 16,000.
7. Is the disciplinary process that impacts the accounting 
profession sufficient?
(Recommendations 8 and 14.)
The staff study criticizes the profession for not being harsh enough in 
disciplining members of the accounting profession for misconduct.
With respect to the Institute’s disciplinary proceedings, several circum­
stances must be borne in mind. The Institute is composed entirely of 
individuals; firms are not eligible to be members. Hence, its powers as a 
private organization are limited to members, and the Institute can only 
bring proceedings against, and impose sanctions on, individuals.
Second, the Institute, unlike public bodies, has no subpoena powers, no 
right to force people to testify, no right to demand the presentation of 
documents; it can, of course, impose penalties, such as suspension from 
membership, for failure to cooperate with a proceeding, but often impor­
tant evidence is in places and hands other than those of members and is 
thus unavailable to the parties.
Third, the desirability of prompt action against errant members must 
be weighed against concerns for fairness. Usually, when allegations of 
improper or inadequate work by an auditor are made, the matter quickly 
becomes involved in civil litigation or SEC disciplinary proceedings, or 
both, or, less frequently, criminal proceedings (regardless of Institute action, 
of course, such proceedings, no matter what the outcome, have a remedial 
effect surely as effective as disciplinary proceedings). If the Institute sought 
to determine whether disciplinary measures should be taken before the 
proceedings pending in court or before the SEC were concluded, the 
evidence adduced in its proceedings and the conclusions reached would 
undoubtedly be used against the persons or firms involved in court. 
Conversely, if the determination were favorable to the member, they 
would undoubtedly be used in his favor. Similarly, the documents 
developed in the course of the proceeding would be subject to subpoena. 
Inasmuch as the standards which would be applied in a disciplinary pro­
ceeding to determine whether sanctions should be imposed and the rules 
for the introduction of evidence might differ markedly from those which
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would apply in a proceeding before a court or the SEC, the use of such 
proceedings, their outcome, or any documents or testimony elicited in the 
course of them in other proceedings could work a distinct hardship on one 
side or the other in the litigation.
To avoid such a prejudice to parties, the Institute has had the practice 
of listing for ultimate determination any matter where it appeared at the 
commencement of or in the course of a legal proceeding that a member 
of the Institute might have been guilty of actionable conduct. The mat­
ter is kept on the list until a final determination is made about it. Thus, 
on the current list of the Institute there are 162 matters related to cases 
pending in court or before the Commission. Each of them will be sub­
ject to active investigation when the litigation is ended or the statute 
of limitations has expired. Because of the protracted nature of proceedings 
in court, many of these matters have been pending for long periods of 
time. Given the desire of the Institute to avoid the prejudice which might 
accrue to a party in litigation if it conducted its proceedings while litigation 
was pending, there is no means of avoiding the appearance of undue delay.
Of course, the Institute, which can, at most, expel a member from a 
voluntary organization, is not the only instrument for discipline in the pro­
fession. Disciplinary matters are also handled by the state boards of 
accountancy, since they are the only governmental authorities which license 
accountants and which can effectively suspend or terminate an accountant’s 
right to practice. In addition, the SEC, through administrative and injunc­
tive proceedings against accountants, exercises substantial disciplinary 
power over accountants involved with financial statements filed with the 
SEC. Thus, in considering the effectiveness of discipline of the profession, 
the entire skein of governmental, legal, and private discipline must be 
considered rather than a single strand standing alone.
Finally, of course, discipline is only one part of a total self-regulatory 
scheme which involves much more than simply punishing errant members. 
The accounting profession establishes educational and testing standards, 
which are stem and demanding, for admission to the profession and the 
right to practice; it establishes and enforces standards of independence; 
increasingly it requires continuing education as a condition to the right 
to practice; it establishes the rules governing how financial statements 
must be prepared and how they must be examined by auditors. Compliance 
with this variety of standards is in significant measure enforced by the 
profession. However, courts have frequently used them as measures of 
the adequacy of an accountant’s performance, implicitly affirming by so 
doing, that the standards themselves are sufficient to protect the public 
interest.
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8. Should the federal government refuse to engage for 
consulting work all firms that do auditing work for the government?
(Recommendation 13.)
The staff study recommends that the federal government engage to do 
accounting and auditing work only firms which do not render consulting 
services to the government. This, of course, is predicated upon the false 
notion discussed above that there is a threat to auditor independence 
when a firm does consulting work for an audit client. Contrary to this 
assertion, the fact is that such services afford the auditing firm an added 
opportunity to gain the knowledge and insight necessary for the best 
performance of auditing services. Further, it is obvious that performing 
consulting services for one agency of the government would not impair 
independence in an audit of another agency.
Professional services are rendered with varying degrees of competence. 
We would suggest that the public interest is best served if consultants are 
selected in each case on the basis of their respective competences for the 
work to be done; if an auditing firm is capable of rendering the best 
consulting work in a given area, the public would suffer by refusing the 
work to that firm because of an arbitrary rule excluding such firm because 
it also did auditing work for the government.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the foregoing analysis establishes clearly that the account­
ing profession is fully able to provide reasonable protection to the public 
in its reliance on audited financial statements. The adoption of the recom­
mendations of the staff study would, in truth, hinder achievement of that 
objective and frustrate efforts now firmly under way, rather than further 
the protection of the public.
We urge that the Congress reject the staff study recommendations which 
would fasten on the auditing profession, and American business, an un­
necessary, unwarranted, and undesirable governmental burden.
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